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Introduction 
In October of 1970, Canada stood still as terror and civil unrest directly 
challenged the unity of the country.  Le Front du Liberation du Québec (FLQ), a 
Marxist terrorist group had strayed from their usual tactic of bombings and 
robberies to the kidnapping of public officials.  Their goal was nothing less than the 
overthrow of the Canadian federal government and the establishment of a new 
Québécois independent state.  On 5 October 1970, James Cross, trade 
commissioner to the British Government, was taken from his residence at 
gunpoint.  Five days later Pierre Laporte, Minister of Labor in the Liberal 
provincial government, was taken from his front lawn by FLQ operatives.  What 
followed was an intense period of governmental and social maneuvers that changed 
the very fabric of Canada and Québec forever.1   
The October Crisis is an event that means different things to Francophone 
and Anglophone Canadians.  For the Francophone community, the October Crisis 
still plays an important role in political sub-consciousness.  For the rest of Canada, 
the Crisis is rarely openly approached or discussed, and when it is, it is a difficult 
reminder of the contradictions present in the Canadian national experiment.  
English Canadians are introduced to the subject only in whispers and English 
scholarship of the October Crisis typically takes a defensive stance over the 
implementation of the War Measures Act (or Act).  In Francophone scholarship 
explorations of the Crisis are mainly concerned with the effects and the injustices 
under the Act and typically avoid direct examinations of the actions of the 
terrorists.  On the whole, the War Measures Act receives a disproportionate amount 
of the attention in current scholarship.  It is not uncommon for historical 
discussions to focus solely on the Act alone, as if the implementation of it existed 
on a plane separate from the overall context of the other events that transpired.  
Unfortunately, these approaches to the October Crisis fail to advance our 
understanding of the event and how it affected the dynamics between two different, 
but utterly linked cultures and communities.  The realities of geography, time and 
space, and an inter-connected late-modern economy do not afford historians the 
luxury inquiries defined only in the language of nationalism.  While it is very 
difficult to examine the October Crisis in the midst of a political debate that is in 
essence still occurring, there exists an opening in which to wedge in a new 
approach to the event.  History could be better served if historians examine the 
                                                        
1 For a more detailed synopsis of the October Crisis see appendix #1.  The reader is also referred to 
the film Action: The October Crisis, 1970, available at 
http://www.nfb.ca/film/action_the_october_crisis_of_1970.  Also see CBC Digital Archives.  
http://www.cbc.ca/archives/categories/politics/civil-unrest/the-october-crisis-civil-liberties-
suspended. 
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subject with new emphasis on objectivity and a set of terms that are not typical of 
the current approaches; one that focuses on the rather deep connections that 
occurred as a result of the violence.   
In draw attention to the daylight between the current camps of 
historiography, the examination herein will attempt to ‘get down in the mud’, as it 
were, in order to understand how violence 2  was utilized by the FLQ 3  and the 
federal government.  Within the conversation that the FLQ engaged in with 
Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau, Québec Premier Robert Bourassa, 
and the respective agencies of the federal and provincial governments, violence 
played a central role in the amplification and interpretation of how one entity 
interacted with the other.  The observers of this violent interaction, the respective 
communities of Québec and the rest of Canada were modified by the events as 
well.   
The October Crisis is an event that plays a very active role in Canadian and 
Québécois identity formation.  The violence of the event still punctuates the debate 
over the powers of government and the exercise of democracy.  Therefore, it is 
essential that Canadians and Québécois alike re-approach the event now that it is 
beginning to fade into our past.  As the separation in time and distance begins to 
grow, the cultural place of the October Crisis grows clearer.  This thesis will reassess 
the critical views of the event from both English and French sources in order to 
inquire how the event transpired, what were the intentions of the terrorists, how 
English and French culture viewed the event, and how the event can be examined 
from a culturally neutral position.  The primary goal of this thesis is two-fold; firstly, 
it seeks to find space for a new historiographical approach, one that will hopefully 
reconcile the current dichotomy between French and English sources; and 
                                                        
2 This work accepts that the violence during this time was not solely utilized by the FLQ.  The 
government of Canada, on both provincial and federal levels engaged in violence against the FLQ 
and the wider Canadian population.  The powers granted to the federal and provincial governments 
under the War Measures Act, such as the suspension of habeas corpus for up to 90 days, arrest without 
warrant, seizure of property and the suppression of speech, were acts of violence.  By using violence 
the federal government engaged directly with the FLQ on their terms. For the purposes of this work, 
violence is defined as any action, physical, or mental, that is intended to force the will of one party 
upon another.  Examples, of this include, but are not limited to, killing, kidnapping, bombing, 
robbery, arrest, confinement, deportation, suspension of liberties, threats of aforementioned 
actions, and softer forms of violence such as taxation, legislation and general governmental policies.  
Violence within the dialogue of the October Crisis is best described in the Clauswitizian terms as 
“War [or violence] is thus an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will” Clausewitz, Carl von, and 
Beatrice Heuser. On War. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 13. Emphasis in original.   
3 While separate cells of the FLQ operated independently as the crisis transpired, the use of 
terrorism by a political movement as a tool of engagement is the primary focus and not in so much 
the actions of individuals working in these cells.  For the sake of simplicity and brevity the FLQ will 
be treated as one entity, as these cells possessed the same common goal and agreed to tactics.   
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secondly, this work will apply a new approach to the October crisis in hopes of 
breaking new ground.  While there is no ignoring the manifested nationalism that 
is evident in the conflict between the parties, there is a way to reinterpret the event 
by applying new techniques that will reveal new common grounds for exploration 
by historians on both sides of the equation.   
 
Literature Review 
The historical placement of the October Crisis of 1970 within Canadian 
and the Québécois culture is dependent upon more factors than just the provincial 
boundaries.  Self-described Québécois and Canadians exist in very different cultural 
spaces and it is understandable that each population would interpret the October 
Crisis differently.  Up to this point linguistic barriers have colored most of the 
scholarship related to the period.  The majority of historical assessments of the 
October Crisis do not examine the cultural interactions between Anglophones, 
Francophones, and bilingual peoples affected by the incident.  Like the continuing 
political dispute between a provincial French Québécois identity and an English 
Canadian identity, secondary historical interpretations are divided along semi-
permanent linguistic lines.4  French scholarship tends to interpret the events in 
terms of linguistic-rights and Quebec historical legacy, while ignoring the broader 
political and social crisis within Quebec and Canada, and areas of potential 
agreement.  At times, English scholarship tends to ‘Orientalize’5 and downplay the 
legitimate agency of the Québec peoples and fails to recognize it own legacy of 
colonial attitudes.  English scholarship is overwhelmingly preoccupied with 
justifying the use of the War Measures Act in response to the Crisis and fails to 
properly interpret the meaning of the political violence.  Neither of these 
approaches fully explains the cultural significance of the October Crisis.6   
What is most troubling about the state of current scholarship is the lack of 
recognition of a cross-border, cross-lingual common culture, no matter how 
minute.  The literature fails to directly explore the cross-cultural reshaping that was 
taking place and ultimately solidifies the discussion around a national identity 
based solely on language and assumed geographic locations.  Current provincial 
                                                        
4 See Figure 1 - The Division of Views on the October Crisis.  It should be stated that there are of 
course exceptions to these tendencies that focus on macro-level issues; however, research has 
revealed a paucity of direct examinations in this regard to the October Crisis itself.   
5 As defined in Said, Edward W. Orientalism. (New York: Random House, 1979); “My contention is 
that Orientalism is fundamentally a political doctrine willed over the Orient because the Orient was 
weaker than the West, which elided the Orient’s difference with its weakness....As a cultural 
apparatus Orientalism is all aggression, activity, judgment, will-to-truth, and knowledge” (Said, 204). 
6 See Tetley, William. The October Crisis, 1970: an insider's view. (Montréal: McGill-Queen's University 
Press, 2007). 
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map lines are not adequate to describe the millions of people who live on opposite 
sides of that border.  While the lingual structures of Canada are constantly 
changing, 7  French and English influences have had a lasting impact on both 
cultures and populations on both sides of the border.  Creolized languages (i.e. 
‘fringlish’), cuisine, music, sport and art are in constant exchange both inside and 
outside of cultural centers;8 centers such as the cities of Montréal and Ottawa, and 
a common northern Ontarian and Québécois culture.   
Among the recent attempts at approaching the October Crisis is 
Dominique Clément’s The October Crisis of 1970: Human Rights Abuses Under the 
War Measures Act as published in the Journal of Canadian Studies stands out as an 
example of the historiographical conflict that surrounds the October Crisis.  
Clément writes that the implementation of the War Measures Act was “responsible, 
directly or indirectly, for extensive human right abuses across the country”. 9  
Clément describes a situation in which public and political fear was unleashed by 
the powers contained in the Act.  She outlines the many incidents of government 
intervention in the lives of suspected supporters and confirmed supporters of the 
FLQ not just in Québec but also throughout Canada.  She ultimately concludes 
that “the federal government continues to reserve the power to restrict human 
rights severely”10 even under the reformed War Measures Act (i.e. the Emergencies 
Act) and the 1982 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.   
Clément does not recognize the actions of the Quebec provincial 
government with regards to the implementation of the War Measures Act.  This 
omission is curious and fails provide balance to the work.  Clément’s work is 
critical of federalism and therefore the participation of the provincial Québec 
government in the machinations of the October Crisis do not buttress her thesis.11  
As well, while arguing against federalism, she invokes a federal cultural connection.  
Clément states, “I argue that the crisis was not limited to Quebec and Ottawa… I 
suggest that the War Measures Act was responsible, directly or indirectly, for 
extensive human rights abuses across the country”. 12   Clément could have 
recognized that her critique of the actions of the federal government was an 
                                                        
7 As evidenced in studies such as Kaplan, David H. “Two nations in search of a state: Canada's 
ambivalent spatial identities”. Annals of the Association of American Geographers. (1994) Vol. 84. 
8 Cultural spaces as described in Dib, K., I. Donaldson, and B. Turcotte. “Integration and Identity 
in Canada: The Importance of Multicultural Common Spaces”. Canadian Ethnic Studies. (2008) 40, 
no. 1: 161-188. 
9 Clément D. “The October Crisis of 1970: Human Rights Abuses Under the War Measures Act”. 
Journal of Canadian Studies. (2008) 42, no. 2: 161. 
10 Ibid., 178. 
11 See Tetley. 
12 Clément, 161. 
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illustration of a consciousness that crosses the political-linguistic divide.  This non-
recognition of a larger narrative is a missed opportunity.  Clément could have gone 
beyond the simple mechanics of the event and talked about how the October Crisis 
joined all Canadians, including the Québécois in a common endeavor, namely the 
protection of human rights.  
The goal of this thesis is not to target specific historians.  However, it is 
important to examine specific examples in order to understand why Canadian and 
Québécois historiography has not evolved around the October Crisis.  It is 
approaches like Clément’s that provide the impetus for a new methodology. 13  
Canadian and Québécois historiography would be better served by an approach 
that can provide answers to what really happened to the cultures of Canada and 
Québec during the October Crisis.  Typically, as the span of time increases from a 
historical event the event is placed in a historical context with greater ease.14  The 
tactical considerations of an event become less important and the strategic level 
considerations become ascendant.  Yet, the October Crisis defies this paradigm and 
it is not easily understandable why.  The War Measures Act is given the bulk of the 
analysis and this is usually done in terms that have more to do with current 
political debates than reasoned and dispassionate reflection.   
Other broader cultural studies, which are not aimed specifically at the 
October Crisis, have attempted to reconcile the conflict between Québec and the 
rest of Canada with increasing success.  These studies approach the tension from 
many useful disciplines, such as political science, psychology, linguistics and more.  
Most of these studies focus on the overarching context of a time of social strife and 
how the dynamics between Canada and Québec were altered.  These studies are 
helpful, but macro theories can render micro events irrelevant and can obfuscate 
specific instances that could lead to a greater understanding.  However, these 
indirect cultural approaches provide the framework for a focused discussion into a 
specific event, such as the October Crisis.   
David Kaplan describes as “Spatial Identities and Spatial Ideologies”15 that 
nationalist and linguistic identification of territory is the source of conflict when 
those boundaries are undefined.  Kaplan’s study is very useful in understanding the 
major shifts in populations and thus the political flashpoints of conflict.  However, 
his paper does not explore the changes in cultural context that these conflicts take 
place in and the terms of the culture.  The lingual status ignores the other factors 
that can illuminate the conflict within the culture.  Jan Erk explores the 
                                                        
13 Another example of a War Measures Act focused approach see Bouthillier, Guy, and Edouard 
Cloutier. Trudeau's Darkest Hour: War Measures in Time of Peace, October 1970. Montréal: Baraka 
Books, 2010. 
14 See Figure 2 - Distance in Time and Historiography, Appendix 1.   
15 Kaplan, 585.  
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permanency political ideology as related to nationalist positions.  Erk posits that 
Québec’s left-leaning culture is a result of two synchronized factors: “(1) the critical 
juncture during which change occurs, and (2) mechanisms of continuity ensuring 
the consistency of the party position”.16  For Erk, the Quiet Revolution and the 
Parti Québécois (PQ) form the basis for the Québec sub-nation nationalism.  This 
model merits further application with regard to the October Crisis and how the 
perceptions on the ground were affected.  Paul Zanazanian points to the historical 
consciousness of Québécois history teachers and rightly observes that “Rather than 
transmitting a shared vision of Quebec's past that integrated both Francophone 
and Anglophone viewpoints, as well as those of other minority groups, these 
initiatives preserved a historical narrative that mostly configured the collective 
identity of the Francophone majority”. 17   Zanazanian highlights the lack of a 
cohesive cultural narrative and how that affects continued cultural conflict, 
something that becomes apparent in the general Québécois response to the Crisis.  
Similarly, Sylvia Söderlind in Ghost-National Arguments outlines the problems that 
nationalism injects into cultural understanding.  She aptly illuminates the 
frustrations that cultural consciousness experiences with respect to national 
identities.  She argues “there is something fundamentally missing when – in an age 
when the concept of nation is more than ever at issue – one writes a history in 
which ‘nation’ is the structuring principle without mentioning the role Quebec has 
played in English-Canadian thinking about nation”.18  Söderlind’s discomfort stems 
from the contradiction that nationalistic politics creates.  This uneasiness is 
especially prevalent with nations as geographically intertwined as Québec and 
Canada.  Jean-Philippe Warren and Eric Ronis address the links between social 
movements and emotion by studying the 1995 Québec unity rally. 19  
Complimenting Warren and Ronis is James Cameron and John Berry’s survey of 
two thousand Canadians that explores the factors related to the psychological 
attachment of nationalism.  Cameron and Berry identify the factors related to 
“Canadian identity and patriotism”.20  The issues they focus on are “the sources 
and structure of patriotism [and] the predictors of patriotism, with a focus on 
                                                        
16 Erk J. “Is Nationalism Left or Right? Critical Junctures in Québécois Nationalism”. Nations and 
Nationalism. (2010) 16, no. 3: 423. 
17 Zanazanian, Paul. “Historical Consciousness and the ‘French-English’ Divide Among Quebec 
History Teachers”. Canadian Ethnic Studies. (2011) 40, no. 3: 110. 
18 Soderlind, Sylvia. “Ghost-National Arguments”. University of Toronto Quarterly. (2006) 75, no. 2: 
674. 
19 Warren J. P., and Ronis E. “The Politics of Love: The 1995 Montreal Unity Rally and Canadian 
Affection”. (2011) Journal of Canadian Studies. 45, no. 1: 5-32. 
20 Cameron, James E., and John W. Berry. “True Patriot Love: Structure and Predictors of Canadian 
Pride”. Canadian Ethnic Studies. (2011) 40, no. 3: 18 
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whether various sources of diversity (e.g., region, ethnicity) have a bearing on 
Canadian national pride”. 21   The data is useful for understanding the modus 
operandi of nationalism in the Canadian/Québécois dynamic.  Hudson Meadwell 
explores the Québec nationalism movement and its unique ability to mobilize 
support for political change. 22   His exploration is useful to understanding the 
political interactions between the Québec and Canadian governments and the 
political support for the PQ.  Meadwell’s analysis downplays the impact of class 
economics and suggests that “the problem of economic viability provides a 
compelling interpretation”23 of Québec’s political mobilization.  
Maurice Pinard and Richard Hamilton posit that “factors other than 
independence account for the PQ electoral success in 1976 and that the 
independence issue limited, rather than increased, the recruitment of new mass 
support”.24  Their theory illustrates the political reasoning behind issue voting and 
applies their research to the 1976 election in which the PQ came to power on a 
platform of independence.  They note that “for many Quebec voters, independence 
was not even an immediate issue in 1976”.25  Thus, the political expressions of 
independence were not even aligned with the desires of the population.  Their 
research raises questions about how political and cultural expressions associated 
with independence are linked.   
Brad Kent offers a comparative analysis of positions adopted by leaders in 
two divided states: Ireland and Canada.  Irish publisher Sean O’Faolain and 
Canada’s Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau are held up for comparison in relation to 
their critiques of the role that nationalism plays in the politics in their respective 
countries.  Kent states that O’Faolain attempted to convince the Irish politicians 
that local nationalistic concerns are single-minded and damaging to the interests of 
their people.26  Likewise, Kent describes Trudeau’s criticism of nationalism in terms 
of the Quiet Revolution and the required social reforms, “French Canadian 
nationalists and the church had created a culture of fear in which the people had 
come to believe that they were under siege, attacked on all sides by free thinkers, 
Anglo-Canadians, Jews, imperialists, and communists”.27  Kent showcases Trudeau 
                                                        
21 Ibid., 18-19. 
22 Meadwell, Hudson. “The Politics of Nationalism in Quebec”. World Politics. (1993) 45, no. 2: 204. 
23 Meadwell, 241. 
24 Pinard, Maurice, and Richard Hamilton. “The Parti Québécois Comes to Power: An Analysis of 
the 1976 Quebec Election”. Canadian Journal of Political Science / Revue Canadienne De Science 
Politique. (1978) 11, no. 4: 740. 
25 Ibid., 741. 
26 Kent, Brad. “Sean O'Faolain and Pierre Elliott Trudeau's Midcentury Critiques of Nationalism”. 
New Hibernia Review. (2008) 12, no. 1: 128. 
27 Ibid., 139. 
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as a leftist leader that rejects Québec nationalism and favors much-needed social 
reform, who then has the issue turned around on him, finding himself on the 
other side of nationalism and painted as a conservative by his rivals.  Kent 
concludes his article by aligning Trudeau with Frantz Fanon and “Like Fanon, 
Trudeau viewed nationalism as but a step on the road to full liberation. Trudeau 
was therefore critical of nationalism’s tendency to be abused as a tool of bourgeois 
hegemonic rule. As a lawyer and a socialist, his approach was a blend of 
constitutional reform and Marxist thought voiced through a socio-economic 
critique”. 28   Kent therefore discredits the much held onto pairing of Québec 
nationalism and leftist social policies.  By creating doubt as to the sincerities of 
Québec sovereignty, Kent opens up discussion on whether or not it was done in the 
spirit of the Quiet Revolution cultural and social objectives.29 
                                                        
28 Ibid., 144. 
29 Other useful studies include Auger, Martin F. “On the Brink of Civil War: The Canadian 
Government and the Suppression of the 1918 Quebec Easter Riots”. Canadian Historical Review. 
(2008) 89, no. 4: 503-540.  Vacante J. “The Posthumous Lives of René Lévesque”. Journal of 
Canadian Studies. (2011) 45, no. 2: 5-30.  Beyond these indirect discussion on Québécois culture and 
politics there are several studies that exist in ‘satellite-range’ to the issue.  These studies are useful for 
supplementing the indirect sources by providing anecdotal or broad discussions about essential 
facets of Canadian society (i.e. multiculturalism, federalism, linguistics and pedagogy).  While not 
directly related to the October Crisis, the views that these studies present facilitate engaging the 
topic in unorthodox ways and may be of interest to the researcher: Hugh Forbes explores the effects 
of immigration and migration on Canadian multiculturalism and cites the growth of distinct ethnic 
groups as a source of ethnic tension, Forbes, Hugh Donald. “Canada: From Bilingualism to 
Multiculturalism”. Journal of Democracy, (1993) 4, no. 4, October: 69-84; Mette Eilstrup-Sangiovanni 
and Calvert Jones examine, albeit in brief, the composition of the FLQ as a functional terrorist 
network, Eilstrup-Sangiovanni M., and Jones C. “Assessing the Dangers of Illicit Networks: Why Al-
Qaida May Be Less Threatening Than Many Think”. International Security. (2008) 33, no. 2: 7-44.; 
Bourhis, Montreuil, Helly, and Jantzen examine discriminatory practices of minorities and disabled 
persons in Québec, Bourhis, Richard Y., Annie Montreuil, Denise Helly, and Lorna Jantzen. 
“Discrimination et linguicisme au Québec: Enquête sur la diversité ethnique au Canada”. Canadian 
Ethnic Studies. (2008) 39, no. 1-2: 31-49.; Karim H. Karim explores multicultural perspectives 
expressed in English language newspapers in an attempt to gage how English Canada feels about 
immigration and Québec relations, Karim, K.H. “Press, Public Sphere and Pluralism: 
Multiculturalism Debates in Canadian English-Language Newspapers”. Canadian Ethnic Studies. 
(2008) 40, no. 1: 57-78.; Dib, Donaldson and Turcotte examine the importance of “multicultural 
common spaces” (Dib, 161) and their importance in developing collective experiences and a shared 
identity Dib, K., I. Donaldson, and B. Turcotte. “Integration and Identity in Canada: The 
Importance of Multicultural Common Spaces”. Canadian Ethnic Studies. (2008) 40, no. 1: 161-188.; 
Brook Thomas provides a general discussion on the exercise of multiculturalism in a broader global 
context and within Québec, Thomas, Brook. “Civic Multiculturalism and the Myth of Liberal 
Consent: A Comparative Analysis”. CR: The New Centennial Review. (2003) 1, no. 3: 1-35.; Chedly 
Belkhodja explores a recent resurgence in Québécois conservatism, Belkhodja, C. “Le discours de la 
<Nouvelle sensibilite conservatrice> au Quebec”. Canadian Ethnic Studies. 2008. 40, no. 1: 79-100.; 
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Unfortunately, none of the above studies directly examine violence and the 
October Crisis.  This gap in Canadian scholarship bears witness to the fact that 
Canadians and Québécois have not learned how to intellectually deal with this 
episode of violence.  For many people of older generations, the October Crisis can 
still reach out to them over forty years of happier memories.  This dark time in 
Canadian history is quickly shunned and deliberately forgotten.  This 
disassociation also illustrates the long-term cost that the use of ‘political violence’ 
accrues.  Violence and its accompanying response is a bitter pill to swallow for any 
democratic constitutional nation.30  While it is not surprising that the secondary 
literature on the October Crisis falls along pre-determined national and linguistic 
lines, it is surprising that the context in which the October Crisis is examined 
ignores the role played by violence.  The violence itself is either ignored or 
dismissed.  Interpretations of the event are either sympathetic to the actions of the 
federal government and Ottawa, or against them.  Some approaches ignore the 
FLQ’s part in the affair altogether.  The result of this historical disconnect is a 
disjointed and incomplete understanding of the October Crisis as an important 
cultural event.  In order to rectify this shortcoming a new methodology must stare 
directly into the darkness of the violence.   
Violence and the October Crisis 
Violence has always challenged historians.  A natural aberrance to violence 
is an appropriate human reaction.  Our difficulties with violence speak to our 
collective desire to live in peace and avoid pain and suffering.  This approach is a 
noble and worthy undertaking and is fine for politics, but troublesome for history.  
Violence, in a historical perspective, could be viewed as a form of communication.  
Violence, which does not cross into genocide, serves to impose the will of one 
                                                                                                                                                       
Joseph Garcea draws into question the utility of multiculturalism, Garcea, Joseph. “Postulations on 
the Fragmentary Effects of Multiculturalism in Canada”. Canadian Ethnic Studies. (2009) 40, no. 1: 
141-160.; Jean-Marie Salien illustrates several pedagogical perspectives on the Québécois language, 
Salien, Jean-Marie. “Quebec French: Attitudes and Pedagogical Perspectives”. Modern Language 
Journal. (1998) 82, no. 1: 95-102.; Barbara Dickson responds to Salien’s arguments and emphasizes 
the value of Québec French as a regional dialect, Dickson, Barbara. “Quebec French: A Canadian 
Response”. Modern Language Journal. (1999) 83, no. 3: 413-416.; and Dianne E. Sears highlights the 
tension between new Québécois French and older linguistic traditions, Sears, Dianne E. "Défense de 
parler: Language on Trial in Michèle Lalonde's “La deffence et illustration de la langue 
Québecquoyse” and “Outrage au tribunal”. French Review. (1995) 68, no. 6: 1015-1021.  These 
studies vary in usage but enhance exploration of the tensions that encompass the Québec/Canada 
relationship.   
30 This is understandable since unapproved and unregulated violence is antithetical to the objectives 
of forming a stable nation. 
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group over another and is inherently communicative in nature.31  The desired end-
state of violence is a change in the understanding of rules of governance and the 
conception of the state of affairs.  In short, in a perfectly just society violence is 
exclusively used to maintain control over the powers of self-determination.   
Different cultures use violence for different objectives.  Violence in the 
western world is used primarily to reformulate political systems, capture or exploit 
resources, or to eliminate opposing groups.32  The western way of violence has been 
used primarily to reform or change fundamental governmental policies both 
internally and externally within states.  Revolutionary violence has always been 
conducted with this objective.  The French Revolution, the American War of 
Independence and the Russian Revolution all utilized violence almost exclusively to 
reform government.  In terms of nationalism, violence is an essential component.  
Thus, in the western mind the sole conception of political violence is in 
terms of governmental change and the utility of this violence is enigmatic to 
historians.  Many philosophical and intellectual historians grapple with the western 
concept of violence; “The assumption that gradual and piecemeal reform had 
demonstrated its superiority over violent revolution as a way to advance human 
freedom is so pervasive that even to question such an assumption seems strange”.33  
Barrington Moore acknowledges that a natural revulsion towards violence presents 
a complication for historiographical views on times of violence and conflict.  
Furthermore, Moore reluctantly recognizes a utility in violence in affecting positive 
change “…the costs of moderation have been at least as atrocious as those of 
revolution, perhaps a great deal more”.34  For Moore, violence can occur in the 
moment or over time and he tacitly implies that less violence is better.  However, 
this dichotomy presents Moore with a fundamental historiography paradox.  How 
can a historian write a history about a time of violence, in which governments were 
improved (i.e. represented its people and this prevented greater violence) and deal 
with the issue of violence?  The paradigm is akin to removing a Band-Aid.  Should 
it be removed fast or slow?  What is worse?  It is difficult for a group to reconcile 
revolutionary violence against the backdrop of forming a peaceful and just society. 
This is as much a moral assessment as it is a historiographical one.  Moore 
is not incorrect in listening to his personal views on violence while iterating 
historical viewpoints.  However, while western historiography struggles with 
                                                        
31 See Clausewitz, On War.  
32 The concept of violence within this work is almost exclusively discussed separate from non-
political criminal violence.  Political criminal violence, such as the FLQ proclivity to fund their 
operations via bank robbery or other such crimes is understood to be a part of this discussion.   
33 Moore, Barrington. Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the 
Modern World. Boston: Beacon Press, 1966): 505. 
34 Ibid., 505. 
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violence, as evidenced in the case of Clément’s critique on the War Measures Act, 
historians are missing an opportunity to find a greater understanding of our politics 
and history.  Historians, like Clément, human in their reactions to violence, could 
potentially miss the larger opportunity to infer greater meaning into the defining 
moments of our history.  A new approach to the October Crisis could be found if 
Canadian historiography was willing to side-step its reaction to violence, if only just 
for a moment, and evaluate the underlying issues.   
In the case of Québec, there is an argument to be made that violence was a 
natural progression of Québec modernization and was, in fact, inevitable and 
necessary.  The Quiet Revolution, non-violent in nature, set in motion ideas that 
were in opposition to the constraints of the old regime. 
Two sets of structural constraints must be overcome by the 
nationalist movement to expand its social base [i.e. having the new 
middle-class assert its authority].  The first set of constraints stems 
from the nature of colonial rule and the local groups which have a 
vested interest in the persistence of the status quo.  The constraint is 
that these groups, politically established or supported by the state, 
control the means of violence in the country.  The other set of 
constraints stems from the preindustrial character of the local 
culture and its traditional commanding institutions.  While they 
accommodate with the status quo, they are marginal to, if not 
resentful of, the ongoing social changes.35 
Québec was in a state of flux at the time of the October Crisis.  The province was 
moving out of a period of industrialization into a modern state with a thriving 
middle class.  Traditional institutions, like the church, were being rejected for more 
liberal institutions that promised better access to wealth and decision-making.  The 
cultural movement modified institutions like unions, media, and more (institutions 
that that did not have the barriers to access like government or the clergy) to 
facilitate the desired changes.  Institutions like government, the Catholic Church, 
and large industrial companies were left to maintain the industrialization project; a 
project that was willingly accepted by all concerned, “The attack up on the 
legitimation of colonial rule as well as traditional social structure is centered on the 
positive acceptance of industrialization”. 36   Something else, not the industrial 
innovations of the colonizers, was responsible for the perceived inequality in 
Québec.  Therefore, it was the nature of the old regime institutions and their 
legitimacy as cultural artifacts that brought them into direct conflict with the 
                                                        
35 Guindon, Hubert, Roberta Hamilton, and John L. McMullan. Quebec Society: Tradition, Modernity, 
and Nationhood. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988): 42-43. 
36 Ibid., 43. 
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revolutionary cultural changes.  In essence the FLQ and those in Québec who 
supported them, outright or not, could no longer tolerate the concept of an 
illegitimate government that was not born of the reconstituted Québec culture.   
The Quiet Revolution was a cultural revolution that was in hyper-drive, as a 
result of Québec’s apprehensive progress in the early 20th century.   It was almost 
inevitable that the right to commit violence held by the state would be challenged 
by the rising anxieties in Québec’s culture.  In the classical western treatment of 
violence, the violence in Québec is viewed in these revolutionary terms.  Yet, 
terrorism and smaller scale violence that cannot present a conventional challenge 
to the modern state is not well understood within the context of this model.  In 
order to understand more clearly the interplay between culture, violence and 
governance, it would now be beneficial to examine an alternative example of 
statehood and institutionalized violence that is far removed from the trappings of 
the west. 
The Aztec Empire is a long way off, in both time and space, from the shores 
of Québec.  However, this distance presents an opportunity to analyze violence in a 
primitive state.  The Aztecs were a violent society.  Violence occupied a special 
place within their society in spiritual and political matters.  Among their most alien 
practices the Aztecs fought Flower Wars in which the objective was to capture, not 
kill, your opponent in order to hold them for a violent sacrifice, which often 
involved gruesome scenes of violence.  Violence and human bloodshed was central 
to the communicative language that the Aztecs utilized.  Their society would 
present a challenge to even the most disciplined western historian to interpret.  
Igna Clendinnen recognizes this undertaking and opens her book on the Aztecs 
stating 
My concern is to discover how ordinary people understood ‘human 
sacrifice’: their inescapable intimacy with victims’ bodies, living and 
dead; how that intimacy was rendered tolerable; what meanings 
were attached to it… My interest is not in belief at this formal level, 
but in sensibility: the emotional, moral and aesthetic nexus through 
which thought comes to be expressed in action, and so made public, 
visible, and accessible to our observation.37 
The same could be said about those who are comfortable with political violence in 
western cultures.  In Clendinnen’s view, Aztec violence operated in a manner 
similar to a language between close relations.  These actions expressed emotions, 
feelings and objectives that verbal or even written language cannot.  Aztec violence 
                                                        
37 Clendinnen, Inga. Aztecs: An Interpretation. (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 
1995): 5. 
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was so developed that it continued in a cyclical, unaltered, and stable form that it 
only finally changed at the beginning of the colonial period with the invasion of 
European powers onto their land.  Now a reader may question what these two 
seemingly separate societies, Québec and Aztec, could possible have in common. 
The correct answer would be very little and this is to the historian’s advantage.  
Clendinnen’s approach to the language of violence raises possibilities to readdress 
how western societies, specifically Québec, utilize violence for the purposes of 
political communication and/or control.  This is the very essence and efficacy of 
the terrorism that the FLQ utilized.   
At the most basic level violence is an instinctive action with which all 
individuals are born.  One of our first acts of communication is crying.  These 
violent and uncomfortable outbursts are designed to bring attention and remedy to 
the most basic of problems.  This is stated not to indicate that the FLQ were crying 
children, far from it, but rather as humans there is an inherent understanding that 
violence equals pain and pain equals behavior modification.  It is our most innate 
ability that we use to affect our environment, “Crying is not only the earliest mood-
signal we give, it is also the most basic”.38   It is a mode of communication that is 
understandable across all cultures and linguistic backgrounds.  It is no wonder that 
when all other channels of communication or petition (i.e. parliamentary elections, 
peaceful protest, etc.) have failed, violence, which is always readily available, is 
utilized. 
As a person ages they increase their ability to communicate in a more 
sophisticated manner.  The ability to express violence increases as well.  The Aztecs 
(or Mexica) possessed a high level of sophistication when utilizing violence to 
control their populations, “…the Mexica ceremonial extravaganzas staged in the 
main temples were dramatizations of a state ideology: exercises in hegemonic 
control which had more to do with the politics of terror than with service to the 
gods”.39  Human suffering conveys a very clear message.  The Aztecs were well aware 
that to display power was to perform the ability to inflict pain and suffering and use 
this to promote governmental efficacy.  As will be explored below in more detail, 
the infliction of suffering on the part of the FLQ was intended to undermine 
governmental legitimacy.   
By these abstract expressions of violence the Aztecs held license over the 
very nature of violence.  There were even sects within Aztec society that specialized 
in the art of pain and violence, “Mexica priests were athletes of self-mortification”.40  
These priests brought violence to its full utility in the name of state goals.  If you 
                                                        
38 Morris, Desmond. The Naked Ape. (Random House: UK. Kindle Edition. 2010): 1706. 
39 Clendinnen, 68. 
40 Ibid., 128. 
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wish to do violence, it must serve a political or spiritual benefit to the state.  The 
implications of this imperative are obvious, however, it is useful to restate them to 
serve this intellectual exploration; non-criminal violence will be tolerated by the 
whole of a society only if it serves the goals of that society.  If a society’s goals 
become divergent, then violence is an acceptable expression outside of the power of 
the state to a minority or majority group within that society.  Similar to how the 
Aztecs would forbid unauthorized acts of dancing or spiritual violence, acts of 
terrorism are likewise forbidden; invoking violence is invoking the power of the 
state.  In short, violence is the universally accepted means of maintaining and 
constructing the state.  This aspect of Aztec society is not absent in the western 
conception of violence and societies. 
 
The FLQ Manifesto 
In the case of the October crisis, the terrorism of the event had some very 
clear reformative objectives.  Shortly after the kidnapping of James Cross the FLQ 
released a manifesto that detailed seven conditions that must be met in order to 
secure his release.41  As part of their demands, the FLQ terrorists sought to have 
their manifesto read on national television.  While Trudeau downplayed the 
importance of reading the FLQ Manifesto on Radio-Canada, there was disagreement 
as to its impact, “Deliberate or unwitting, [the decision to read the manifesto] 
proved to be a major blunder… the manifesto’s impact on the people of Quebec 
was impressive.  While they overwhelmingly disapproved of the FLQ’s methods, 
they vehemently approved [sic] of their aims”.42  The FLQ Manifesto was a successful 
effort to create a milieu of violence and political purpose.  In this respect the 
terrorists had achieved one of their greatest aims; namely that of utilizing violence 
to rally the people of Québec to their goals, “Revolutionary violence is nothing but 
the organized and conscious violence of a people, a class, a national or 
multinational collectivity [sic]…”. 43   This success would not have been possible 
without the FLQ’s act of violence.  Through violence the legitimacy of the federal 
government was, at least ideologically, drawn into question. 
Lacking any formal power and the possibility of widespread political success 
under the normal channels of government, violence became the only vehicle of 
communication available to the FLQ.  However, this use of violence did not come 
without a tactical price.  Going forward the FLQ would have to justify their violent 
mode of communication.  The Manifesto detailed that the use of violence was 
                                                        
41 Bélanger, Damien-Claude Editor. 2007. FLQ Manifesto, 1970. Trent University. 
42 Guindon, 151. 
43 Vallières, Pierre. White Niggers of America; The Precocious Autobiography of a Quebec ‘Terrorist’. (New 
York: Monthly Review Press, 1971); 224. 
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justified as a response to repressive violence of a colonial regime.44  In this way the 
FLQ was equating themselves to the governments of Québec and Canada and 
characterizing their action as ‘responsive’ in nature justified their existence in their 
supporters in the citizenship of Québec.  Their violence was justified since it 
concerned directly matters of the state and self-determination.  
Throughout the Manifesto the images of violence are present, “The Front de 
libération du Québec wants total independence for Quebecers, united in a free 
society and purged for good of the clique of voracious sharks, the patronizing ‘big 
bosses’ and their henchmen who have made Quebec their private hunting ground 
for ‘cheap labor’ and unscrupulous exploitation”.45  Sharks, henchmen and hunting 
grounds are all nouns that set the tone for the rest of the document.  It can be 
discerned from this passage that the FLQ sees their actions as a reaction or a 
defense against predators who have thrown the first assault.  They even state so 
explicitly, “The Front de libération du Québec is not an aggressive movement, but 
rather a response to the aggression perpetrated by high finance through the puppet 
governments in Ottawa and Québec”.46  By the use of this language the FLQ has 
indicated how they see the operation of their surroundings and what constitutes 
their standard of violence.47  It is worth noting that the original aim of the FLQ was 
the worker state and not necessarily separation.  The push for language rights 
comes later and could be viewed as a tool tapping into larger Québec frustration 
over language and federal interference.  When this becomes part of their goal the 
FLQ gained more prominence and support. 
Like most Marxists, the FLQ sees violence in the economic actions of the 
capitalists.  But the violence that the FLQ sees cannot be remedied by any 
traditional action that existed.  The FLQ was heartened by the gains that the PQ 
made during the election, “but the Liberal victory clearly demonstrates that what 
we call democracy in Quebec has always been, and still is, a ‘democracy’ of the 
rich”. 48   Note that the FLQ does not criticize the fundamental concept of 
democracy, but they do not wholly embrace it either.  The authors of the Manifesto 
tacitly state that democracy is a legitimate system of government (or at the very least 
                                                        
44 As can be inferred by some of their vocabulary, the FLQ was heavily influenced by the examples of 
Carl Marx, Che Guevara, Frantz Fanon, and others.  The October Crisis was an event that took 
place within the period of worldwide decolonization and is interpreted by contemporaries of the era 
as such.  Yet, Québec’s situation differs in many material respects from the Algerian, or Cuban 
examples; the most obvious being that the Québécois are a western people with a legacy inherited 
directly from another colonial power with a tradition of colonialism and democratic institutions.  
There exists further room for research on this obvious dissonance.   
45 Bélanger, 2007. 
46 Ibid. 
47 As defined earlier, violence can be economic in nature, the FLQ echo that sentiment here.   
48 Bélanger, 2007. 
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they do no deny it).  Their grievance is that this so-called ‘democracy’ has been 
overcome by corruption and influence.  It was the “election riggers”49 that won the 
election for the Liberal Party, and therefore the self-determination of the Québécois 
had not been honored.  In a sense the FLQ is seeking to delegitimize the will of the 
majority in an effort to justify their will.  Though this is obvious, this paradigm is 
also not as simple as it sounds.  The FLQ disregards those French-Canadiens who 
are active participants in the provincial democratic process and while 
simultaneously seeking to represent the same people.  At the time in Québec, and 
even currently, there exists a large contingent of Francophones who wish to remain 
in Confederation.  Trudeau, Bourassa, and more recently Jean Charest typify these 
Canadiens.  It was not unusual for the FLQ to dehumanize this section of Québec 
society in an effort to dismiss this group as an abboration, “In FLQ circles of the 
late 1960s, it was not uncommon to denounce Trudeau publicly by naming him a 
‘fairy’ or a ‘faggot’”.50  Even more ironic was the fact that Pierre Vallières and 
Trudeau worked together against the Duplessis Regime in their association through 
Cité Libre.51   
More to the point, the FLQ wished to reject the traditional Canadian-
British style of democracy as a wholly foreign entity, “we have washed our hands 
lean of the British parliamentary system and the Front de liberation du Québec will 
never allow itself to be distracted by the electoral crumbs that the Anglo-Saxon 
capitalists toss Quebec’s way every four years”. 52    The criticism of the British 
parliamentary system is of prime interest within this argument.  One cannot help 
but wonder what the FLQ’s position on the parliamentary system would have been 
if the PQ had won the 1970 provincial election.  The implication the Manifesto’s 
authors André Roy and Jacques Lanctôt 53  wish to convey is that there is a 
fundamental and cultural difference between that which is just and that which is 
not.  The embodiment of justice in Québec is that which is Québécois, and that 
must be so within every facet of Québécois life.  As such, ‘token’ gestures by the 
Québec government such as Québec’s first language law Bill 63, socialized medicine 
                                                        
49 Ibid. 
50 Palmer, Bryan Douglas. Canada's 1960s. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2009): 549. 
51 See Cloutier, Normand, Tom Daly, and Robin Spry. Action: The October Crisis of 1970. (Montréal: 
National Film Board of Canada, 2006): 4:50, and Vallières, 204.  As well, Trudeau’s involvement 
with the paper may have indirectly bolstered the rise of Québec Nationalism, “No surprise then that 
the search was on, so to speak, for a new way of linking fraternity, power and time meaningfully 
together. Nothing perhaps more precipitated this search, nor made it more fruitful, than print-
capitalism, which made it possible for rapidly growing numbers of people to think about themselves, 
and to relate themselves to others, in profoundly new ways” Anderson, Benedict. Imagined 
Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. (London: "Verso", 2006): 38. 
52 Bélanger, 2007. 
53 Tetley, 32. 
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and more became not just inadequate choices in governance but anti-cultural 
actions that were specifically designed to destroy Québec culture even though these 
actions, especially healthcare, leaned sharply to the left.  The FLQ formulated their 
response around these cultural differences and sought to reject these forms of 
oppression, as they perceived it.  Their ideology became so rigid and absolute that 
violence became a permissible step.   
This segue into violence begs a fundamental question about the Manifesto 
that needs to be answered is: Could the grievances of the FLQ and the larger 
francophone population be remedied in a means that did not require terrorism or 
violence?  For argument’s sake, suppose that the PQ had accomplished their 
objective in the election of 1968 that Québec be declared a free and independent 
nation.54  This outcome would prove to be problematic for the theoretical force 
behind the FLQ.  If the rejection of all things British is fundamental to the 
ideology of the FLQ then how can they move forward in a system of power that 
they have rejected?  For the FLQ, the problem was not the semantics of 
government, it was government.  The FLQ’s decision to forego the democratic 
process thus leaves the violent overthrow of government as the only option.   
‘Crossing the Rubicon’ in regards to violence may be an anti-democratic 
action, but it is not an anti-nationalist action.  It can even be stated that violence is 
a necessary action for the FLQ if they seek to accomplish their aim of creating a free 
and independent state.   
No more arresting emblems of the modern culture of nationalism 
exist than cenotaphs and tombs of Unknown Soldiers… Yet void as 
these tombs are of identifiable mortal remains or immortal souls, 
they are nonetheless saturated with ghostly national imaginings. 
(This is why so many different nations have such tombs without 
feeling any need to specify the nationality of their absent occupants. 
What else could they be but Germans, Americans, Argentinians . . 
.?55 
The concept of nationalism demands a new spiritual basis upon which to build a 
nation.  If the nation of Québec is ever to come into being then martyrs, as a point 
of reference, are required.  This necessitates that the revolutionary be unknown, or 
next to unknown, committed, and to have no other option remaining.  At the end 
of his work, FLQ’s Vallières echoes this sentiment, “My dreams are ‘measureless,’ 
and yet I am an ordinary man, I think.  I cannot ‘live my life’ without working to 
                                                        
54 As described above, there are already indications that the anti-Duplessis movement had begun to 
splinter after the Liberals came to power.   
55 Anderson, 9-10. 
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make the revolution, and it seems to me that it is pretty much the same for you”.56  
As a Marxist, Vallières rejects the traditional Catholic religion and modifies his 
noun and adjective selections to convey a similar level of devotion and urgency; 
‘ordinary’, ‘dreams’, and ‘measureless’, all accomplish this spiritual goal.57  Vallières 
is aware that violent action has a specific utility and if he wishes to destroy the old 
regime it must be utilized in a populous and ordinary fashion.  This approach may 
be useful in obtaining the new nation state the FLQ so desperately desires, but does 
little to advance the nation after the revolutionary process.  
As sometimes happens within revolutionary or nihilistic ideologies, there is 
a movement and justification to destroy the current system but have nothing to 
replace it.58  The FLQ was no different in this respect.  Nowhere in the Manifesto, 
short of the mention of Marxism, are there suggested tactical remedies to the 
problems of governance in Québec.  The FLQ expose this dissonance in the 
Manifesto as well, “And the Montreal policemen, those strong-arms of the system, 
should understand these reasons – they should have been able to see that we live in 
a terrorized society because, without their force, without their violence, everything 
fell apart on October 7!”59  (Bélanger).  The treatment of the police within this 
passage presents problems for the FLQ.  They recognize that the police are both the 
terrorizer and the terrorized.  The FLQ is at the same time appealing to the 
consciousness of the police while assailing it at the same time.60  There is little 
doubt that the FLQ would have accepted and even encouraged an insurrection 
among the police.  Such access to violence could not be declined but leaves the 
FLQ in a difficult position.  This contradiction indicates that there existed some 
uncomfortable ideological problems for the FLQ, many of which were put aside 
until their primary goals could be achieved through the necessary violence.    
In addressing the Montréal Police in this manner the FLQ admit that their 
desired society will need and should utilize violence; it is the direction of that 
violence that is of primary concern.  For the FLQ there is no way to govern sans 
violence; there is no way to oppose without violence.   Ultimately, the FLQ can 
neither throw the grenade nor put the pin back in, “On October 7, 1969, 
Montreal’s police officers and firefighters staged an illegal strike.  The city was 
                                                        
56 Vallières, 254. 
57 Again, there is a parallel to the Aztec culture of violence and spiritualism.  The FLQ needs to 
associate just violence with the only aspect that can truly separate the Québécois from the rest of 
Canada, language.  Going forward  language will be held as sacrosanct in Québec.   
58 See Fathers and Sons by Ivan Turgenev.  Turgenev explores the social frustration of the youth in 
pre-Bolshevik Russia.  Turgenev surmises that the difficulties of governance are not remedied by the 
impetus to destroy a broken system.   
59 Bélanger 2007. 
60 Again, the FLQ presents a paradoxical relationship with the majority of Québec.   
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rocked by several hours of violence and mayhem”.61  The police and firefighters 
utilized a language that the FLQ clearly understood; agree with our position or find 
uncontrolled violence upon you.  While the mode of the coercion is not so 
different than the modus operandi of the FLQ, the primary concern is the motivation 
behind the violence and the degree to which a level of violence serves the objective.  
If the illegal strike of the Montréal police had continued on for a longer period, 
their message would have changed.  The strike would have ceased to be a labor 
relations dispute and would have become revolutionary in nature.  This potential 
for escalation belies the nuances that violence, as a language, can convey.  Even 
though the respective spoken languages may indicate differently what is actually 
occurring in a particular incident, the violence conveys its own meaning.  Violence 
in this case is a language that is basic enough to be understood by all participants, 
yet so unique that no words can match its meaning.   
The Manifesto terminates with four lines or slogans that were synonymous 
with the October Crisis and the greater separatist movement, “Long live free 
Quebec! Long live our imprisoned political comrades!  Long live the Quebec 
revolution!  Long live the Front de libération du Québec!”. 62   Here the FLQ 
specifically links their struggle to the earlier calls for Québec independence such as 
Charles De Gaulle’s infamous speech in 1967 in which he followed up calls of 
‘Long live Montréal’ and ‘Long live Québec’ with “Vive le Québec libre!”.63  De 
Gaulle’s proclamation created an international rift between Canada and France, 
and propelled the separatist movement into the international spotlight.  This step 
was vital to the authorization of violence associated with the separatist movement.  
The struggle the FLQ undertook was not just a struggle between Canada and 
Québec but was also a part of a much larger narrative of nationalism.64  While this 
context may be out of the scope of this exploration, it is useful to say that De 
Gaulle’s statement brought to light the concept of Québec as a nation.  The 
                                                        
61 Belanger, 2007. 
62 Ibid. 
63 Société Radio-Canada. Vive le Québec libre!, Les Archives de Radio-Canada. Dernière mise à jour: 
24 juillet 2008. http://archives.radio-canada.ca/politique/provincial_territorial/clips/1048/, [Page 
consultée le 19 décembre 2012.] 
64 This international (and unsolicited) recognition vaulted the concept of Québec as an imagined 
community to the foreground, “The nation is imagined as limited because even the largest of them, 
encompassing perhaps a billion living human beings, has finite, if elastic, boundaries, beyond which 
lie other nations” (Anderson, 8).  De Gaulle, without even realizing it, was projecting the 
international conception of nationhood to his Québécois audience in.  For De Gaulle, who may 
have been mildly confused, France was elsewhere and his surroundings, familiar in language only, 
had to be that of another nation.  In his mind, if Québec is defined as French-speaking and does not 
exist in the national borders of France then this must be an independent nation unto itself and De 
Gaulle acted as such.   
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violence that followed was an indirect result of that nationalistic endorsement.  An 
independent Québec is an expression of nationalism; nationalism and the social 
change that it demands are either facilitated in moderation or through the rapid 
actions of violence, as Moore describes.  Nationalism is a language of violence all 
on its own and a nation cannot exist without the aid of those who hold the capacity 
for violence (i.e. police and soldiers).  De Gaulle, a soldier himself, helped to 
solidify these motivations in the hearts and minds of the Québécois with a single 
word: ‘libre’ (free) and brought the advance modern conception of nation into a 
collision course with an anachronism of the early 20th century that was extant in the 
legal framework of Canada.   
 
The War Measures Act 
It would be unavoidable and irresponsible to analyze the October Crisis and 
not include any reflection on the War Measures Act.  However, it would be equally 
irresponsible to speak of the Act without putting the actions of the government into 
the proper context.  The period leading up to the October Crisis was one of social 
change and turbulence throughout North America and the world. 
Canada was faced with two serious ‘political’ crimes, however they 
had not simply appeared out of nowhere.  Other countries faced 
even greater turmoil.  May ’68 had literally shattered the 
foundations of France… combined with spectacular political 
assassinations–John F. and Robert Kennedy, Malcolm X, and 
Martin Luther King Jr.…On May 4, 1970, the United States 
National Guard opened fire on a demonstration at Ohio’s Kent 
State University and left four students dead.  All this happened in 
the run-up to Canada’s crisis in 1970 and the people of Canada 
were fully aware of these events that were taking place in other 
countries.65  
Arguably the world had entered into a new phase of social dialogue.  Social strife 
and transformation were occurring all over the globe, violently in many instances.  
As is typical with changes in the social structure of any society there is a lag in the 
systems of government and the societies they govern.  Indeed, these lags are often 
the causes of revolutions (i.e. the rise of the bureaucratic class in pre-revolutionary 
France, or the lack of representation of the American colonies in the British 
parliament).  The implication of these lags in the systems of government is that the 
tools that governments have to deal with new social challenges are anachronistic in 
nature.  This paradigm is akin to the phenomena of modern industrialized 
                                                        
65 Bouthillier, 13. 
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militaries always being ready to fight the ‘last’ war.  Such is the case with the War 
Measures Act as its genesis indicates. 
Prior to the October Crisis, Canada invoked the War Measures Act 
on only two other occasions. The first use was between August 4, 
1914 and January 10, 1920. ‘The occasion of the Bolshevik 
Revolution in Russia in 1917 was the cause of the passage of a 
number of regulations and orders under which membership in 
certain organizations was proscribed and individuals were interned.’ 
The Act was used a second time during the period from August 25, 
1939 until 1945”.66   
The War Measures Act was gestated in a very different time than the 1970s.  The 
primary purpose of the Act was to enable the executive branch of the federal 
government to deal with the perceived threats to sovereignty of the early 20th 
century, specifically the rise of communism and other revolutionary ideologies.67  
This alone is evidence of a lag in the utility of the War Measures Act.  Historical 
scholarship should point out injustices and abuses that occurred under the Act with 
the qualification that governments are, by their very nature, reactive in nature and 
always prepared for events in hindsight.  The War Measures Act was tailored to 
another threat and another time.  Unfortunately, it was the only all-encompassing 
executive power that was available to deal with the unique situation that was 
presented to Trudeau and Bourassa in 1970.   
Due to the lack of limits on executive power contained within the Act, it is a 
reach to expect that the Act could have been used with the requisite temperance 
and responsibility that the October Crisis demanded.  Trudeau and Bourassa used 
the Act, as imperfect as it was, to calm the crisis and these powers were deactivated 
when the crisis abated.  There is justification to argue that the Act was not 
deactivated soon enough, as it was officially ended in April 1971.  The replacement 
of the War Measures Act with the Emergencies Act68 (albeit 10 years later; again a 
reactionary action) reflects this criticism, wherein the Emergencies Act will expire 
                                                        
66 Palframan, Krista.  “Emergency Powers in Canada; Revisiting the War Measures Act”.  (Toronto: 
York University, Osgoode Hall Law School, 2012): 4. 
67 Since the evolution and changes to the Act are out of scope for the primary purpose of the 
discussion contained herein, the Act will not be examined in excrutiating detail.  In summary, the 
Act was enacted and subsequently modified to allow the federal government to control the internal 
political climate in Canada.  The main objective of the Act was silencing ideas and undesired 
political dialogue that the governement perceived as a threat.  The War Measures Act was analogous 
to the U.S. Alien Enemy Act (1798).  See War Measures Act, 1914 (2nd session), c.2. 
68 See the Emergencies Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. 22 (4th Supp.), http://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/E-
4.5/index.html 
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automatically after 30, 60, 90 and 120 days (depending on the type of emergency) 
without the approval of Parliament.   
The War Measures Act garnered the federal and provincial governments 
extraordinary powers that included 
(a) censorship, and the control and suppression of publications, 
writings, maps, plans, photographs, communications and means of 
communication;(b) arrest, detention exclusion and 
deportation;…(d) transportation by land, air, or water and the 
control of the transport of persons and things;… (f) appropriation, 
control, forfeiture and disposition of property and of the use 
thereof.69 
Suffice to say the Act is and should be considered an act of violence even if that 
violence does not constitute physical harm.  Imprisonment, seizure of property and 
censoring of speech can be viewed as acts of violence.  The police were granted 
these new powers under the Act they quickly moved to utilize these new powers. 
Within hours, the police mobilized to arrest and detain suspected 
terrorists and their supporters.  The police conducted over 3,000 
searches and 497 people were detained… The average detainee spent 
a week in jail; yet the vast majority of them (87%) were later released 
and never charged with a crime.  Sixty-two people were charged by 
January 1971.  Within a month, half of them were released and the 
charges were dropped.  In the end, only 18 people were convicted of 
a crime arising from the crisis.70 
It is important to note that beyond the powers of arrest, the government was not 
authorized to inflict bodily harm and outside the civil unrest seen in the streets, no 
citizen in Québec or Canada was killed or severely impaired.  Conversely, the FLQ 
made no effort to abdicate the power of bodily harm and utilized it often.  Between 
1963 and June 1970 the FLQ killed six civilians in a series of bombings, raids and 
robberies that, sadly, some scholars often fail to mention. 
It may also be that there is an uncomfortable acceptance of the violence 
perpetrated by the FLQ.  During a 1970 call into the English-speaking radio 
program Double Take on CBC Radio, a Francophone caller (she remains 
unidentified) summarizes the discomfort and her struggle with the use of violence 
by the FLQ.71  She commences her call in a calm manner describing her every day 
                                                        
69 Bélanger, Claude.  1999.  Proclamation of the War Measures Act, October 16, 1970.  
Marianopolis College.  
http://faculty.marianopolis.edu/c.belanger/quebechistory/docs/october/wm-act.htm [accessed 21 
December 2012] 
70 Clément, 167. 
71 See appendix 2 for full transcription.   
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experiences and frustrations under the linguistic hegemony of English within 
Québec.  She condemns the violence of the FLQ, but supports the contents of the 
Manifesto.  There is a chilling moment during the call when she admits, that while 
she has never been violent in her life, the violence she sees on the streets may be a 
good thing, “maybe it is going to shake something up.  And maybe the government, 
they think ahead the next time they do something”.72  It is an astonishing evolution 
of her personal view that takes the listener through a transformational moment.  
She has weighed the costs and benefits of the violence against her observed level of 
social inequality and her eventual acceptance of violence indicates that social 
inequality in Québec is too great to tolerate.  This insight illustrates just how 
important the concept of language is to the Québécois and may explain why 
violence, depending on the source and magnitude, is not always viewed with equal 
measure.  Yet, this case proved to be the exception and not the rule.  
While it may appear that an individual’s perspective of the War Measures 
Act is universally determined by one’s language, the reality at the time was very 
different “In a Gallup Poll published on 12 December 1970, 89 per cent of English-
speaking Canadians approved of the federal government’s action in adopting the 
War Measures Act Regulations, while 6 percent disapproved and 5 per cent were 
undecided.  Among French-speaking Canadians, 86 per cent approved, 9 per cent 
disapproved, and 5 per cent were undecided”.73  This support for the actions of the 
federal government may have waned as the crisis receded into memory.  Also the 
criticisms of the Act were taken more seriously since the Emergencies Act replaced it.  
This poll is more indicative of the fact that French and English Canada, two 
societies of the western tradition, while diametrically opposed in their opinions on 
the fate of Québec’s institutions, were near universally united in their rejection of 
the types of violence in accomplishing these aims.  The legacy of the October Crisis 
in this respect was a “sad and costly loss of innocence”74, brought on by the killing 
of Pierre Laporte, an action that still taints the politics around the quest for 
sovereignty.   
 
Why Pierre Laporte Had to Die 
On 10 October 1970, Pierre Laporte was kidnapped from his home in 
Saint-Lambert, Québec by members of the FLQ.  On Friday, 16 October 1970 at 3 
                                                        
72 Canadian Broadcasting Corporation.  1970.  “Francophone caller supports FLQ manifesto”.  
CBC Digital Archives.  http://www.cbc.ca/archives/categories/politics/civil-unrest/the-october-crisis-
civil-liberties-suspended/francophone-caller-supports-flq-manifesto.html [accessed December 21, 
2012]. 
73 Tetley, 103; Trudeau, Pierre Elliott. Memoirs. (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1993): 143; and 
Cloutier, 80:45 (who cites a “vast majority”).   
74 Cloutier, 86:17. 
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a.m. “letters from the government of Quebec and the city of Montreal, requesting 
the application of the Regulations under the War Measures Act, are received in 
Ottawa by the Federal government.  The War Measures Act Regulations are put in 
force at 4 a.m.  Police throughout Quebec round up more than 250 suspects by 
evening [sic]”.75  On Saturday, 17 October 1970, “[an] FLQ note is found at 9:30 
p.m. saying that Laporte had been ‘executed’ at 6:18 p.m.”.7677   
By taking a step back and regarding the sequence of these events in an 
objective fashion a pattern emerges.  The respective actions of the FLQ and the 
governments involved in the crisis appear similar to a conversation.  Each 
respective action is tactical in nature.  However, beyond their immediate effects 
these actions can be construed as argumentative in nature.  One tactic leads to 
another and each is designed to persuade and/or convince the opposition of their 
dominance; which in turn is followed by a counter response or a desired 
capitulation.  The overall strategic conversation can be construed in terms of social 
change and larger socio-political movements.  These individual acts of violence 
deserve greater scrutiny.   
The violent acts described above can be isolated as follows: (1) Pierre 
Laporte is kidnapped; (2) the War Measures Act is put into effect; and (3) Pierre 
Laporte is murdered.78  Each step is a provocation of the last.  Pierre Laporte’s 
kidnapping is an escalation of an earlier state of affairs.  The implementation of 
violence during the Crisis was of great concern to all involved, especially to the 
FLQ.  The death of Pierre Laporte was especially troubling for the FLQ going 
forward and recent attempts at revisionism concerning this fact confirm this.  
Former FLQ members are claiming that the death of Laporte was accidental.   
Le gouvernement Bourassa le savait parce que la police a 
illégalement enregistré les confidences faites en prison par Jacques 
Rose à son avocat Robert Lemieux. M. Rose y raconte que son frère 
Paul, pourtant condamné pour le meurtre, ne se trouvait même pas 
à la maison de Saint-Hubert lorsque le drame s'est produit. Les 
ravisseurs étaient sur le point d'évacuer Laporte vers un lieu plus sûr 
lorsqu'il s'est mis à crier et qu'il est mort, étranglé dans une 
                                                        
75Tetley, 207. 
76 Ibid., 208. Emphasis added.  
77 The entire note read, “Fàce à l’arrogance du GV federal et son valet Bourassa, fàce à leur mauvaise 
foi évidente, le FLQ a donc décidé de passer aux actes.  Pierre Laporte, minister de chômage et de 
l’assimilation a été execute par la Cellule Dieppe (Royal 22em)”. See Cloutier, 61:51. 
78 It is fully recognized here that these actions are an editing of a larger narrative.  The selection of 
Pierre Laporte’s kidnapping as the first step to be examined is by no means intended to give the 
reader the indication that the FLQ took the first steps towards engaging in violence, whatever that 
reality may be.   
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bousculade [The Bourassa government knew (he was killed 
accidentally) because the police illegally recorded statements made 
in prison by Jacques Rose's lawyer Robert Lemieux.  Mr. Rose tells 
his brother Paul, however, convicted of the murder, was not even in 
the house of Saint-Hubert when the tragedy occurred.  The 
abductors were about to evacuate Laporte to a safer place when he 
started screaming ‘he died’, strangled in a physical struggle].79 
In retrospect it in more than likely that this account of Laporte’s death is correct.  
The account explains the presence of a pillow in the trunk of the car that Laporte 
was found in.  It is also supported by the evidence laid out by the coroner’s report, 
“[Laporte] succumbed to acute asphyxiation after having been choked by a chain 
that he wore around his neck”.80  While it is highly unlikely that any court would 
rule that the FLQ were not responsible for the death of Laporte, this account 
neglects to explain the note that the FLQ sent to police stating that they had 
‘executed’ Laporte.  In that note the FLQ describe Laporte as “Minister of 
unemployment and assimilation” saying that he “was executed… [and] the 
exploiters of the Quebec have only to behave themselves [sic]”. 81   Thus, the 
semantics of how Laporte died are nuanced and even more important to this 
exploration.  If Laporte was killed as the revisionists state, then why was a note 
stating he was executed sent?  Why didn’t the FLQ describe the death as accidental?  
While the answers to these questions may never be known, there is room to 
speculate.  The FLQ may have been trying to save face.  Announcing that they 
accidently murdered their hostage would make them appear bumbling and reckless, 
losing them support in the process.  It may also have been that from their 
immediate perspective the death of Laporte worked in their favor.  His death could 
have been spun as a response to the War Measures Act and the dialogue of violence 
could continue.   
The FLQ had killed before, so the attempts at revisionism were not to cast 
them as some kind of peace warriors.  The violence of killing remained in their 
toolbox.  This reinterpretation indicates that while violence is a useful language 
that can be utilized to amplify political desires, the language of violence is 
unsophisticated and clumsy.  In this instance, the FLQ escalated beyond their 
means.  The execution of Laporte was too much for most Québécois to swallow 
and they lost support.  As evidenced by the attempts at revisionism and parsing 
related to the execution of Laporte, the FLQ acknowledges that they crossed a line 
                                                        
79 Gendron, Guy.  “Revelations sur la mort de Pierre Laporte”.  Radio-Canada.  http://www.radio-
canada.ca/nouvelles/Politique/2010/09/23/006-flq-mort-laporte.shtml, [Page consultée le 
20 décembre 2012.]  My translation.   
80 Ibid., 141. 
81 Tetley, 142. 
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that would be detrimental to their cause.  It could also be that the prior deaths were 
perpetrated remotely, by bombings, this tactic depersonalized their victims to the 
general public; these victims were simply unlucky and not intentionally killed.  It is 
one thing to kill a nameless government employee, it is a very different action to 
kill while looking into a helpless victims eyes.  This time they actually had blood 
directly on their hands and it may be that the members of the FLQ and the public 
couldn’t reconcile that distinction. 
In another respect, assuming it was an intentional act, the killing of Laporte 
shows how the supply of resources required to commit violence can have an impact 
on the conversation.  The FLQ had a limited number of means with which to 
commit acts of violence.  They were limited to bombing, kidnapping and murder, 
and up to the time before the murder of Laporte, all but the latter had been 
attempted.  Conversely, the federal government had at its disposal any number of 
tactics with which to pressure the FLQ.  Arrests, seizure of property, soldiers on the 
street, military assets and police raids, unfettered access to the media and much 
more were available to federal and provincial governments.  It is possible that the 
FLQ surmised that since the federal government had changed tactics, more 
bombings and kidnappings were not going to advance the conversation.  With 
limited means and no new way to respond to the implementation of the War 
Measures Act, the FLQ may simply have run out of options and thus so did Pierre 
Laporte.  
 
Cross-Lingual Messaging Model 
It is quite possible that, in spite of themselves, the FLQ accelerated a 
process that would ultimately bring about their worst nightmare.  The FLQ’s use of 
violence may have been the exact ingredient required to deny them the sovereignty 
they so ardently sought.  After the social and cultural strife of the 60s and 70s, the 
cultural concepts of self and identity fundamentally changed in Canada.  English 
Canada began to take interest in how Québec fit into the conception of the 
Canadian identity.  During the October Crisis, the FLQ found that their violence 
gave them a new voice and illuminated a group in Canada that had rarely taken the 
national stage before then.   
Before the Quiet Revolution there is a clear dominance of English cultural 
messaging82 over French.  The lack of language laws, the dominance of English in 
public spaces and the teaching of English in the public school system all contribute 
                                                        
82 Cultural messaging is defined as cross-lingual transmission of thoughts or ideas that originated in 
one linguistic party and intended for the other, on a conscious level or not.  ‘Francophone caller 
supports FLQ manifesto’ is an example of this kind of messaging.  This messaging can also include 
literature, the arts, political speech, movies, music and other forms of entertainment.   
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to this dominance.83  During the period prior to the October Crisis, but post-Quiet 
Revolution, the amount of cultural messaging that was being transmitted and 
received by the English from French sources remained stable.  English Canada was 
not listening any more or less to French sources prior to the Crisis.   
The revolutionary period was internal in nature and did not engage external 
groups outside of the Francophone community in Québec.  The Francophone 
consciousness had come alive during the Quiet Revolution and limited its 
consumption of English cultural media, as evidenced by the increases in French 
media sources and popular music (i.e. Cité Libré, artists such as Gilles Vigneault, 
and Félix Leclerc).  As indicated in Appendix #1, Figure 3, the Quiet Revolution 
served more to blunt the reception of English sources by the French population 
than increase the amount of reception by the English of French cultural 
knowledge.   
The actions of the FLQ affected both English and French populations in 
ways that had never existed before.  The weight of cross-lingual cultural messaging 
shifted dramatically before and after the October Crisis and the beginning of the 
Quiet Revolution. 84   The English language overwhelmingly dominated cultural 
messaging before the Quiet Revolution.  This dominance is evidenced by the 
growth of English language instruction present in the public education system and 
the lack of French language protections.  Lack of language protection was the main 
grievance of the Québécois population, as indicated by the Francophone caller, 
“just one thing so simple as to have French for the province of Québec, officially 
French like the other provinces have English”.85  The fact that she chose to call into 
an English radio station and speak in a language that she was not terribly 
comfortable in is extraordinary.  She clearly intends that an English audience 
receive her message.  Just by the very action of her call shows that something has 
changed within the context of the dialogue between the French and English 
Canada; this may very well have been the entry of violence into the conversation.   
Her selection of verbs and adjectives is also quite revealing.  Among them 
‘shake’, ‘participation’, and ‘listen’, all indicate that the violence is intended to 
engage an English observer to their problems.  As appendix #1, figure 3 indicates, 
the amount of cultural messaging during the Crisis increased dramatically.  The 
violence had an effect.  English Canada was listening to the grievances of the 
                                                        
83 See Pinard, Maurice, and Richard Hamilton. “The Parti Québécois Comes to Power: An Analysis 
of the 1976 Quebec Election”. Canadian Journal of Political Science / Revue Canadienne De Science 
Politique. (1978. 11, no. 4): 756; and Coleman, William D. “From Bill 22 to Bill 101: The Politics of 
Language under the Parti Québécois”, Canadian Journal of Political Science / Revue canadienne de 
science politique, (Sep., 1981. Vol. 14, No. 3): 467; Kaplan; and Dib. 
84 See Appendix #1, Fig. 3. 
85 Canadian Broadcasting Corporation.  1970.  “Francophone caller supports FLQ manifesto”.   
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Québécois, whether they wanted to or not.  If the FLQ had accomplished anything 
through their violence it was to underline the social inequalities that existed in 
Québec.  It is important to note that the issue that took precedence in the debate 
between Canada and Québec was not the Marxist-Leninist objectives of some of the 
members of the FLQ, but the language and cultural concerns of the francophone 
population.  While Marxist doctrine may have provided an impetus for members of 
the FLQ it was not that doctrine that breached the gap between English and 
French Canada.   
After the crisis had abated the state of relations between French and 
English Canada had been permanently altered.  The violence of the War Measures 
Act may have also served to create this parity.  The injustices that were felt in 
Québec were extended beyond those provincial borders into other parts of Canada, 
“In Toronto, a local school board considered a motion to ban teachers from 
speaking about the FLQ in their classrooms”86 and “Premier [of British Columbia] 
W.A.C. Bennett, in a perplexing moment of extremism, declared that the 
provincial cabinet had approved a regulation banning any teachers in the province, 
including college and university professors, from expressing sympathy with the 
FLQ”.87  While Clément labels these actions humans rights abuses (they are more 
appropriately called civil liberty violations), they indicate that there is a shared 
experience that occurred during the October Crisis.  Not only did the rest of 
English Canada, as far away as British Columbia, become aware of the social 
conflict in Québec, there was now the very real possibility that it would affect them 
personally.    
In a way, the War Measures Act gathered the Canadian population around 
the federal mission and started the conversation about how Québec and the rest of 
Canada see their identity.   This realization aided in bringing the respective weights 
of cultural messaging closer to a state of parity.    
 
Conclusion 
Violence is central to the October Crisis and is the main reason it continues 
to hold sway in the Canadian consciousness.  In societies where the primary 
objective of their continuation is the reduction of violence, violence can amplify 
minority positions, engage the larger political discourse, and if utilized correctly, 
affect change in favor of the originator.  There is also a spiritual power to violence 
that can captivate, mystify and, transfix the attention of an audience.  There is little 
doubt that the FLQ was able to brodcast their position, force the larger political 
consciousness to engage with their ideas, and affect some kind of change in 
                                                        
86 Clément, 169. 
87 Ibid., 170. 
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Québec.  The only question that remains is whether that change was a positive one 
and moved the FLQ closer to their goals.  
If the originator of violence is to be successful in achieving their goals they 
must possess a wide capacity for violence.88  Greater access to a larger variety of 
means for violence, translates into more versatility while engaged with an adversary.  
However, access to a greater set of means for violence is expensive and difficult to 
implement.  Police, armies and government-like bodies cost a great deal in terms of 
resources.  The FLQ did not possess the resources, manpower, or the might of a 
military.  The FLQ could not compete with the federal government’s greater 
vocabulary in regards to violence.  Also, at the outset of the October Crisis the FLQ 
had more options for violence than at the end.  As the crisis went on the federal 
government was able to maneuver their resources and stymie the FLQ’s ability to 
use more legitimate forms of violence (i.e. popular uprisings).  The deployment of 
soldiers and increased arrest powers meant that the FLQ could not destroy property 
or kidnap officials with the relative ease that had existed before.  Only harder forms 
of violence (i.e. the murder of Laporte or Cross) were available to the FLQ.  While 
these means were easier to implement, they carried great risks.  However, harder 
forms of violence threaten to delegitimize the originator and are antithetical to 
their ultimate goals.  Both the federal government and the FLQ sought to assert 
their legitimacy as representatives of the people of Québec through violence.  In the 
eyes of the Québécois and the rest of Canada, acts of violence are only viewed as 
legitimate if they are done on behalf of the will of the majority, and then only if 
they are executed in the softest possible manner; in this case, both progenitors of 
violence were guilty of violating the latter.  While it could be argued that the FLQ 
was acting in the best interests of the majority of Québécois, it was the manner of 
their violence that ultimately led to their undoing.  In Québec the ends do not 
always justify the means.  In the eyes of many in the Québec population, the FLQ 
had a legitimate goal, but they simply lacked the appropriate capacity to support 
that goal.  
Conversely, the federal government was acting on behalf of two legitimate 
yet increasingly opposed societies, the Québécois and the rest of Canada.  Their 
greater capacity for violence allowed Trudeau to maneuver around this dichotomy 
and support his vision for a unified Canada under a powerful and centralized 
federal government.  As a result of the October Crisis, the federal government was 
also in danger of being delegitimized.  After the crisis had subsided, members of 
opposition parties (i.e. Tommy Douglas and John Diefenbaker) were concerned 
with the wide reaching powers the government possessed under the War Measures 
Act.  Many members saw this free access to means of violence as not just a threat to 
                                                        
88 See Figure 4 – The Range of Capacity for Violence 
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personal freedom, but a threat to Canadian federal legitimacy and subsequently 
replaced the War Measures Act with the Emergencies Act.  This is why the Act features 
so prominently in scholarly works that are focused on questioning the power of the 
federal government; the War Measures Act is utilized as a foil to delegitimize the 
federal government because of the violence that it grants.  This assertion is also 
buttressed by the above-discussed attempts of revisionism.  The murder of Pierre 
Laporte by the FLQ, in the cold manner in which it was executed, proved too much 
for the majority of the Québécois and ultimately served to delegitimize the 
separatist movement. 
The October Crisis left the Québec separatist movement divided and 
hobbled.  The fact that 86% of the Québec population supported the actions of the 
federal government 89  and just ten years later 40% of the same population 
supported sovereignty90 is evidence of this division among separatists.  The federal 
government was also not left unscathed as there were serious questions remaining 
about the legitimacy of the federalist project.  In all, the October Crisis can be 
viewed as a conversation over legitimacy, using a language based on violence, set 
against a backdrop two unique cultures that sought the most peaceful means of 
obtaining their independent objectives.   
Political violence was and will continue to be a reality in Québec politics.  
During the most recent Québec election, the PQ victory rally was interrupted by 
gunfire, while the assailant “[a] crié «les Anglais se réveillent, les Anglais se 
réveillent» [cried ‘The English are waking up’]”.91  While there is a justifiable urge 
to dismiss a lone-gunman out of hand, the violence that was displayed is a part of a 
larger conversation and should not be ignored.  It is the violence with which Henry 
Bain chose to speak that is most disconcerting.  If anything, his attack on the PQ 
coupled with his cries in French (important to note since Bain is Anglophone), is 
an amplified scream that is in the same syntax as the October Crisis.  Additionally, 
in the run up to the recent provincial elections, the student tuition crisis also had a 
violent component and the Québec government invoked emergency powers in 
response to it.92  As is true about most things in Québec, what is often heard is not 
often understood.  Likewise, the violence of the October Crisis has much more to 
say if historians are willing to listen. 
                                                        
89 Tetley, 103; Trudeau, 143; and Cloutier, 80:45 
90 Canadian Brodcasting Corporation.  1980: 'Non' to sovereignty in Quebec referendum.  CBC 
Digital Archives.   
91 Boivin, Mathieu.  5 septembre 2012. Attentat durant le discours de Marois: une victime 
succombe.  La Soleil. 
92 Radio-Canada. “Manifestations contre la loi special”, http://www.radio-
canada.ca/nouvelles/societe/2012/05/18/002-manifestation-etudiants-vendredi.shtml [accessed 21 
February 2012]. 
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Appendix #1 – Figures and Illustrations  
Figure 1 – The Division of Views on the October Crisis  
 
 
 
Figure 2 – Distance in Time and Historiography 
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Figure 3 – Cross-Lingual Exchanges Between English and French Culture in 
Canada  
 
 
Figure 4 – The Range of Capacity for Violence  
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Appendix #2 – Timeline of the October Crisis and the FLQ 
February 1963 - Le front de libération du Québec (FLQ) is founded 
March 1963 - The FLQ bombs three Canadian Army barracks 
April 1963 - The first FLQ manifesto is written 
April 1963 - FLQ bomb kills night watchman Wilfred O'Neil, first fatal attack 
August 1964 to June 1970 - Four more people are killed by FLQ bombs 
5 October 1970 - James Cross (British Trade Commissioner) is kidnapped 
8 October 1970 - FLQ Manifesto is read on Radio-Canada television 
10 October 1970 - Pierre Laporte (Québec Minister of Labour) is kidnapped 
12 October 1970 - The army begins patrol operations in the Ottawa region 
15 October 1970 - The army is called into Québec 
16 October 1970 - The War Measures Act is put into effect  
17 October 1970 - Pierre Laporte is murdered by his kidnappers 
3 December 1970 - James Cross is released and his kidnappers are flown to Cuba 
 
Appendix #3 – Transcription of “Francophone caller supports FLQ manifesto” 93 
I have a lot of frustrations with [English people] … there are some basic 
needs here… and I think that I should be able to live my whole day in French… I 
work in French… when I answer the phone, like many other people, I answer in 
French… the English people that call them there, they are aware that they are in the 
province of Québec that it is French here.  They hear the operator answer in 
French, they hear me answer back in French and they still talk to me in English.  I 
insist very much.  I get offense because I find to my surprise that about eight 
persons out of ten do have some notions of French… but they don’t use it… I am 
sick of having to ask all the time of [for] a menu in French… service in French… if 
the English listen to the French radio station… they are going [to be surprised] 
because most of the population here do not approve of the FLQ, the way that they 
are doing it.  But they approve of what is in the [manifesto], they approve of the 
ideas that they are brining forward… I hear English people they always talking of 
law and order and democracy.  Well that makes me sick, because I vote once in 
four years and I want participation I don’t just want a vote.  And the participation I 
want, all that is left to me is to go down in the street once in a while because the 
people don’t listen.  And if I go down to the street like all the people did for the 
bill this week… have just one thing so simple as to have French for the province of 
Québec, officially French like the other provinces have English.  Well, this was 
                                                        
93 For complete audio see http://www.cbc.ca/archives/categories/politics/civil-unrest/the-october-
crisis-civil-liberties-suspended/francophone-caller-supports-flq-manifesto.html 
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refused to me by my government, you know?  And I have never been violent in my 
life, but now in the bottom of me I think that maybe it is a good thing, what’s 
happening, maybe it is going to shake something up.  And maybe the government, 
they think ahead the next time they do something. 
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